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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




Ronald K. Miles; Gordon C. Miles; Kenneth Miles;
Ernest L. Miles, Jr.; Joyce Cauley; 
     Appellants
v.
Township of Barnegat; Connective Power Delivery;
Comcast; Jersey Central Power and Light; Verizon;
Vincent Filardo; Barnegat Water Company; John
Does 1-100; New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection; Frederick Gerken; Naomi Gerken; Ernst, Ernst & Lissenden;
Pinelands Commission; Diane Filardo; Walter Deetz; 
Darlene Deetz; Frank Bisignano; Helen Bisignano; 
Pheasant Run Adult Community; Remington Vernick &
Verna Engineers; Heritage Point South Adult Community;
Shore Sand & Gravel, LLC; Mirage Adult Community
Four Seasons; OceanCounty Engineering;
                                           Nelke/Constantine & Associates;
WSB Engineering Group, P.A.
Heritage Point South Adult Community,
                                                    Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff
v.
Mignatti Enterprises, Heritage Point L.P.,
                                                    Third Party Defendants
Pheasant Run Adult Community,
                                                    Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff
v.
  Defendants Kelleher, Hess, Rahn, DeMeiller, and Gioia, former employees of1
Barnegat Township, are not parties because they were not served; defendant Darlene
Deetz was dismissed from the case by stipulation of the parties.  (See D. Ct. Op. at 2 n.3
& 4).  On December 24, 2008, we dismissed the appeal as to Ocean County Board of
Health pursuant to the stipulation of the parties.
2
Ridgeway Development Corp.,
                                                    Third Party Defendant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 05-01661)
District Judge:  Honorable Joel Pisano
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 1, 2009
Before: FISHER, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN , Circuit Judges





Ronald K. Miles, Gordon C. Miles, Kenneth Miles, Ernest L. Miles, Jr., and Joyce
Cauley (collectively referred to as the “Plaintiffs”) appeal pro se from the order of the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing their § 1983
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6).1
3The Plaintiffs are siblings who inherited six contiguous properties (hereafter
“Plaintiffs’ property”) in the Township of Barnegat (“Barnegat Township”), New Jersey,
in January 2003.  According to the Plaintiffs, Barnegat Township allegedly created public
rights of way (Catherine Street and Cloverdale Road) on the Plaintiffs’ property,
approved plans for water drainage from adjacent properties (the adult community
developments known as “Pheasant Run” and Heritage Point South”), and granted
easements to these private development corporations for water drainage onto the
Plaintiffs’ property.  From 1988 through 2004, the overflow from the detention basins
flooded their property, creating a man-made wetland that has rendered the property
“unbuildable,” according to the Plaintiffs.  The County of Ocean’s (“Ocean County”)
underground storm water tunnels, which run through the Plaintiffs’ land, allegedly
contributed to the flooding problem.  The Plaintiffs say that the Pinelands Commission,
which had previously declared the Plaintiffs’ property to be “buildable,” changed its
position and declared that part of the property constituted a wetland.  They also allege that
the Department of Environmental Protection allowed some of the defendants to file
fraudulent applications for the placement of wells on the Plaintiffs’ property.
The Plaintiffs believe that adjacent landowner defendants Deetz, Gerken,
Bisignano, and Filardo placed wells on their property without their consent; fraudulently
granted easements to the property to Verizon New Jersey, Connectiv (now known as
“Atlantic County Electric Company”), and Comcast of New Jersey; and otherwise
4encroached on the Plaintiffs’ land.  They alleged that Verizon, Connectiv, and Comcast
placed utility lines, cables, and telephone wires on their property without their consent;
the surveyor defendants omitted or misstated key information from their respective
surveys in an effort to diminish their property; and the engineering defendants encroached
on their property by placing detention basins so close to the boundary that the water
runoff caused their land to flood.  The Defendants deny the Plaintiffs’ claims and dispute
the boundaries of the Plaintiffs’ property.
In 2005, the Plaintiffs filed a twenty-six count § 1983 complaint alleging
violations of their Fifth Amendment rights under the Takings Clause, violations of
procedural due process, and a widespread § 1983 conspiracy involving all of the
defendants to encroach on and diminish their property.  In addition to the § 1983 claims,
the Plaintiffs raised state-law claims, including, inter alia, a claim that the Township
fraudulently changed the boundaries of their property on various Township maps.  They
sought damages.
Some of the Defendants filed answers to the Amended Complaint, and asserted
cross-claims against their co-Defendants for contribution and indemnification.  After
some discovery had transpired, most of the Defendants filed motions to dismiss, claiming
that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that, in any event, the
Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  In March 2007, the
Magistrate Judge allowed Plaintiffs’ counsel to withdraw from the case.  The Plaintiffs
  Barnegat Township and Ocean County argue that the Plaintiffs failed to present a2
federal question on the face of their Amended Complaint.  We disagree.  The Plaintiffs’
Fifth Amendment takings claims present a federal question.  The immediate federal issue
is whether the constitutional claims are justiciable or ripe for a federal court’s
consideration of the federal question.  See County Concrete Corp. v. Township of
Roxbury, 442 F.3d at 164 (“The ripeness doctrine serves to determine whether a party has
brought an action prematurely and counsels abstention until such time as a dispute is
sufficiently concrete to satisfy the constitutional and prudential requirements of the
doctrine.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).  Here, the District Court disposed
of the claims on ripeness grounds.
5
filed pro se responses in opposition to the Defendants’ dismissal motions.  They also
requested permission to file a second amended complaint.
By order entered on January 7, 2008, the District Court granted the Defendants’
motions to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and dismissed the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in its entirety as to all
Defendants.  The District Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Plaintiffs’
takings claims because they were unripe under Williamson County Reg’l Planning
Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).   Assuming that a2
taking of their property had occurred, the District Court concluded that the Plaintiffs
failed to avail themselves of New Jersey’s procedures for obtaining compensation
pursuant to the Eminent Domain Act of 1971, N.J.S.A. § 20:3-1 et seq.  The District
Court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) the Plaintiffs’ claims alleging violations of
procedural due process because New Jersey afforded them a full judicial mechanism with
which to challenge the Township’s decision to build a road on their property.  The
6District Court dismissed the remainder of the § 1983 claims for failure to state a plausible
claim of state action with respect to the private party defendants.  The District Court
refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ state law claims and over
the Defendants’ cross-claims.  The Plaintiffs filed this timely appeal.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District
Court’s dismissal on the grounds of ripeness and failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted is plenary.  Taylor Inv., v. Upper Darby Twp., 983 F.2d 1285, 1289 (3d
Cir. 1993) (ripeness); Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (Rule
12(b)(6) failure to state a claim).  A district court is not limited to the face of the
pleadings in deciding a motion to dismiss a claim as unripe.  See Taylor Inv., 983 F.2d at
1289 n.7.
In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The
plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.”  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).  Well-
pleaded factual content is accepted as true for purposes of determining whether the
complaint states a plausible claim for relief.  Id. at 1950.  The assumption of truth does
not apply, however, to legal conclusions couched as factual allegations or to “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” 
7Id. at 1949.  “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”  Id.
We conclude that District Court properly dismissed the Plaintiffs’ procedural due
process claims for the reasons stated in the District Court’s Opinion.  Viewing the
allegations as true, the factual matter falls far short of permitting us to infer a plausible
connection among the private party defendants and a governmental agency or official
such that their private actions would constitute “state action.”  See Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982); Groman v. Twp. of Manalpan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d
Cir. 1995) (“A private action is not converted into one under color of state law merely by
some tenuous connection to state action”).  In addition, the single-sentence conclusory
allegations of a conspiracy contained in the Amended Complaint are insufficient to allege
a plausible conspiracy among the defendants to deprive the Plaintiffs of their
constitutional rights under § 1983.  See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; see also Kost v.
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 185 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that establishing the existence of
an ‘understanding’ among private parties and state actors for § 1983 conspiracy purposes
is really nothing more than another way to show state action by alleging a private party’s
connection to a state actor).
We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the Plaintiffs’ takings claims are
not ripe for review under Williamson County, as they have not availed themselves of 
  Strictly speaking, the Plaintiffs’ takings claims are in the nature of “inverse3
condemnation” because they allege a taking of their property without resort to the
eminent domain process and without just compensation, in violation of the Takings
Clause.  “‘[I]nverse condemnation’ is essentially ‘a short-hand description of the manner
in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when
condemnation proceedings have not been instituted.’”  Perduto v. City of North
Wildwood, 88 F.2d 725, 728 n.4 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Clarke, 445
U.S. 253, 257 (1980)).  It is “a remedy designed to protect the landowner whose property
has been taken de facto by insuring that he is paid reasonable compensation for it.” 
Matter of New Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 166 N.J. Super. 540, 544 (N.J. Super.
1979).
The Plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claims are the kind that are subject to the
ripeness requirements under Williamson County.  See Perduto, 878 F.2d at 728 (“Under
Williamson, appellants must still obtain a judgment on their inverse condemnation claim
in state court before their federal claims ripen”).  Under New Jersey law, aggrieved
property owners like the Plaintiffs may initiate an action for inverse condemnation by
requesting a writ of mandamus from the Law Division of the Superior Court compelling
the governmental entity to initiate condemnation proceedings.  Id.  The Plaintiffs admit
that they have not pursued an action for just compensation pursuant to New Jersey law. 
(Plaintiffs’ Brief, at 7).  Hence, their claims are not ripe for review.
8
their remedies under New Jersey law.   Relying on County Concrete Corp. v. Township of3
Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2006), the Plaintiffs argue that their challenge to the
“direct conduct” of the Ocean County and Barnegat Township defendants in taking their
property without instituting an eminent domain proceeding, is the kind of “facial” takings
claim that is not subject to Williamson County.  (Plaintiff’s Brief at 3 & 6).  The
Plaintiffs’ reliance on County Concrete is misplaced.  The landowner in County Concrete
raised a takings claim that attacked a zoning ordinance on its face as violating the
landowner’s right of just compensation under the Takings Clause.  County Concrete, 442
F.3d at 168.  Here, the plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim seeks just compensation,
9not the invalidation of an ordinance or statute on its face.
Relying on Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 1995), the
Plaintiffs next argue that their claims against Barnegat Township and Ocean County are
substantive due process claims to which the rule in Williams County does not apply.  The
Plaintiffs are mistaken.  In Blanche Road, the plaintiff landowner’s substantive due
process claim, alleging a harassment campaign waged by Township employees against the
plaintiff landowner, constituted an actionable § 1983 claim based on the landowner’s right
to be free from harassment in its land development efforts.  Id. at 268.  The substantive
due process claim was unrelated to Bensalem Township’s decision regarding Blanche
Road’s land-use permit application.  Id.  Here, there is no actionable substantive due
process claim unrelated to the Defendants’ conduct in taking the Plaintiffs’ property
without resort to the Eminent Domain Act.  Whether the claims are characterized as
substantive due process claims or as a takings claims, the result is the same.  The claims
are not ripe for review until the Plaintiffs avail themselves of their just compensation
remedies in state court.
We have thoroughly reviewed the remainder of the Plaintiffs’ claims on appeal and
conclude that they are meritless.  Because there was no justiciable federal question, the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the Plaintiffs’ state law claims.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).  As for the Plaintiffs’
motion to file a second amended complaint, which we understand to have been overlooked
10
or denied implicitly, we conclude that it would be futile to remand the matter for the
District Court’s consideration, as nothing in the proposed second amended complaint cures
the defects in the Amended Complaint.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d
103, 106 (3d Cir. 2002).  The Plaintiff’s judicial bias claim also lacks merit.  The
Magistrate Judge’s adverse rulings do not form an adequate basis for recusal.  See
SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Moreover, we find nothing in the record that suggests “a deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism” by the District Court that would preclude fair judgment.  Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
